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Sammendrag 
Vi analyserer de viktigste kildene til direkte og indirekte FoU-subsidier til foretak i Norge i perioden 
2002-2013 og sammenligner deres effekter på foretakenes resultater. Foretak som mottok støtte 
matches med en kontrollgruppe av foretak som ikke mottok støtte. Endringer i resultatindikatorer – før 
og etter støtte – i behandlingsgruppen sammenlignes med endringene i kontrollgruppen. Vi finner at 
de gjennomsnittlige effektene av FoU-støtte blant de som har fått tilskudd og/eller subsidier, er 
positive og signifikante når det gjelder resultatindikatorer knyttet til økonomisk vekst: verdiskaping, 
salgsinntekter og antall ansatte. De estimerte effektene er større for oppstartsselskaper enn de etablerte 
foretakene når effektene måles som relative effekter (i prosentpoeng), men mindre når disse effektene 
omregnes til nivåeffekter. Vi finner ikke positive effekter på kapitalavkastning eller produktivitet for 
foretak som mottok støtte sammenlignet med kontrollgruppen. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a mutual understanding among economists that technological progress is closely linked to 
economic growth and that it is spurred by investments in Research and Development (R&D) (see e.g. 
Romer, 1990). The mechanisms connecting innovation and productivity are related to both existing 
and new firms, and to destruction of less efficient ones. Among existing firms, R&D might show up as 
creation of new goods and services, leading to increased demand for the products of the firm, or to 
changes in the way the firm operates through process- and organizational innovations. R&D may also 
lead to entry of more efficient firms and new firms on the technology frontier. 
 
If firms themselves would get the whole economic benefits of their R&D investments, there would be 
no need for public support of R&D in the business sector. Thus, when policy-makers emphasise the 
importance of public R&D support, it is based on the understanding that there are market failures and 
spillovers related to investments in R&D (see e. g. Griliches, 1992). A common source of market 
failure is knowledge externalities. Such externalities may occur if it is difficult to establish ownership 
rights of new production methods or technologies, enabling competitors to take advantage of 
investments in R&D without bearing the costs. The government might subsidize R&D investments to 
reduce the marginal cost of R&D and/or the perceived risk of external investors or lenders. In this way 
government support may lead to increased R&D and/or innovation activities (see e.g. Hall and van 
Reenen, 2000.) 
 
The average gross domestic spending on R&D as percentage of GDP in the OECD countries has been 
quite stable over the period 2000-2016, varying from 2.1 to 2.4 (OECD 2018). At the same time 
OECD (2016, Figure 4.7) shows that the intensity of public support has increased as a percentage of 
GDP in most OECD countries over the last ten years. With this as a background, and knowing that in 
many countries there are several co-existent and potentially complementary support schemes, the goal 
of this paper is to evaluate quantitatively the economic benefits of R&D subsidies on firms’ 
performance. The results presented are based on indirect methods where it is assumed that investments 
in R&D can lead to product and process innovations, which in turn can be reflected in performance 
indicators measured over time. The outcome variables studied are (firm-level) sales revenue, number 
of employees, value added, labour productivity (valued added per employee), and return on assets. 
These outcome variables are highly relevant from a policy perspective as the analysed subsidy 
instruments are intended to contribute to increased value added and employment in R&D-intensive 
firms. 
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The main novelty of this paper lies in our ability to study all the major sources of R&D subsidy 
programs in one country – Norway – simultaneously; both direct subsidies (grants) and tax credits. 
This is potentially of great importance, as a large share of firms that receive direct support also receive 
tax benefits (but not vice versa). Our data have two key features that we exploit: (1) we can merge 
firms with information about received public support over a long time period: 2003-2014, (2) the data 
have universal coverage of incorporated firms with detailed accounting, employment and ownership 
information. The combination of three contemporaneous policy instruments, the long length of the 
analysed period, and the possibility to link policy instruments with firm level data make our study 
unique compared to the existing literature. Although there are other studies that address the issue of a 
firm simultaneously using multiple sources of public support (e.g. Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bentoa, 2013, 
and Dumont, 2017), we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to analyse all major sources of 
support in one country and matching these data to the whole population of (incorporated) firms.  
 
Using panel data, we can monitor the outcome variables over time – before and after support – and 
compare with a control group of firms that do not receive support, i.e. firms that are representative of 
the counterfactual outcomes for those receiving support. The advantage of such an approach is that the 
outcomes are possible to measure both for the treatment group and for the control group. However, 
there can be a large element of randomness in such comparisons, which necessitates large datasets to 
distinguish systematic differences from spurious correlations. Thus, one needs both a sufficiently large 
treatment group and a large reference population from which one can draw the control group. If the 
premises of the matching are met, one can interpret the estimated effect as a causal effect of the policy 
instruments among the firms that actually receive support: the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT).  
 
Our empirical findings seem to indicate the following: First, our estimates of the average effects of 
support are positive and significant in terms of performance indicators related to economic growth – 
but mostly non-significant regarding labour productivity or returns to assets. Second, there is a clear 
tendency that (1) the estimated effects are higher for start-up firms than for incumbent firms when the 
effects are measured as relative effects in percentage points, but lower when the relative effects are 
translated into level effects, (2) higher for the tax credit scheme and the Research Council of Norway 
than for Innovation Norway, and (3) that the effects increase with the amount of support. In particular, 
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support that amounts to under NOK 500 000 (60 000 Euro)1 have little or no effect, whatever the 
policy instrument.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 surveys the existing literature. Section 3 
presents information about the institutional setting in Norway. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 
describes the matching procedure and the general econometric model used for the analysis. Section 6 
provides the main results and several sensitivity analyses, and discusses the results in light of existing 
findings. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
2. Exiting Literature 
The issue of whether public R&D spending and government subsidies are complementary and 
additional to private spending or tend to crowd out private R&D has been discussed in many prior 
studies. A critical survey of some early microeconometric studies is given by Klette et al. (2000), with 
focus on the problem of establishing a valid control group in a non-experimental setting. Also David et 
al. (2000) are critical to the earlier literature and conclude that the many estimates of crowding out 
effect and input additionality found in the earlier literature are generally biased due to selection issues. 
The more recent microeconometric literature on the effects of public programs to spur private R&D, 
are generally more aware of – and explicitly address -- methodological problems. Examples include: 
Wallsten (2000) (U.S. firms), Duguet (2004) (French firms), Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) (German 
firms), Cappelen et al. (2012) (Norwegian firms), Lokshin and Mohnen (2013) (Dutch firms), Dumont 
(2017) (Belgian firms), and Dechezlepretre et al. (2016) (UK firms). 
 
The most commonly used empirical framework for studying the economic impact of firms’ R&D and 
innovation activities is the so-called CDM model. In their original paper, Crepon et al. (1998) propose 
a three-stage model. First, they specify a probit model of the decision to undertake an innovation 
activity. Conditional on a positive outcome of this (binary) choice, the firm chooses its R&D intensity 
and, finally, the economic outcome variable of interest (e.g., productivity) is analysed within a 
standard regression framework. Later developments and applications of the CDM framework are 
reviewed in Lööf et. al. (2017). Takalo et al. (2013) propose a similarly structured approach, but 
where the focus is on the impact of public policy: the dependent variable in the first step is a dummy 
of whether the firm has a project with public support or not.  
 
                                                     
1 Based on the mean exchange rate of about 9 NOK per EURO during the period analysed. 
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While our model is consistent with both the three-stage CDM framework and the approach of Takalo 
et al. (2013), we use a more reduced form framework that does not require R&D or innovation data at 
the firm level to study the effect of R&D support on economic outcomes. In our approach, the firm 
decides to apply for tax credits and/or a grant; if it is accepted, the firm undertakes the project and may 
thereby increase its knowledge stock, which again may have positive effects on performance 
indicators, such as economic output or productivity. The critical prerequisite for our analyses is that 
our control group of firms is representative of the counterfactual outcomes for the firms that receive 
support (i.e., the outcomes if they had not received support). The average difference between the 
actual and the counterfactual (hypothetical) outcomes is the treatment effect we want to estimate. 
3. Institutional setting 
Since 2002, the three main government instruments to promote R&D and innovation in the business 
sector in Norway have been Innovation Norway (IN), the Research Council of Norway (RCN), and the 
R&D tax credit scheme Skattefunn (SKF). IN as we know it today, was formed through a merger of 
the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund, the Norwegian Trade Council, 
Government Consultative Office for Inventors and the Norwegian Tourist Board. IN's activities 
consist of district programs and innovation applications, and are mainly financed by local 
governments, the Ministry of Regional Development, and the Ministry of Fisheries. Our evaluation 
covers only the innovation programs, as the other IN-programs are not aimed at promoting R&D and 
innovation, but give direct support to sparsely populated areas or the agricultural sector. The 
innovation programs include grants, innovation loans, capital loans and advice to companies to 
develop a new product or new technology, or promote organisational innovations. 
 
The tax credit scheme Skattefunn (SKF) was introduced in 2002 for small and medium firms (SMEs). 
The scheme was expanded in 2003 to include all firms. SKF is regulated by Norwegian tax law and is 
subject to supervision by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA). Through the SKF tax credit 
scheme, firms get tax credits for R&D; either tax deductions or cash refunds (see below). Only 
approved costs provide the basis for tax deductions.2 From 2003, the SKF scheme granted large firms 
18 percent of R&D expenses related to an approved project up to a limit of 4 million NOK. From 2009 
to 2013, the maximum limit was 5.5 million NOK. Hence, the maximum tax relief for a large firm3 
                                                     
2 Only projects approved by the Skattefunn division of the Research Council of Norway provide a basis for tax deductions. 
This only applies to costs that the firms have incurred in the income year the approval was granted. The tax authorities 
control the stated costs and aggregate public support for the enterprise under the State Aid Code. 
3 Since then the limit has been increased several times and is now NOK 25 mill. 
8 
was about one million NOK (about 110 000 Euros). For SMEs the rate is 20 percent. The tax refund 
takes place the year after the actual R&D expenses have occurred (and the project was approved). If 
the firm’s taxes are less than the refund, the remaining tax credit is given as a direct grant (see 
Cappelen et al., 2010 for more details). In fact, each year about three fourth of the total tax subsidies 
are given as direct grants.4 
 
While SKF is a general instrument, support from the Research Council of Norway (RCN) is a 
selective instrument, where firms compete for funds. The main argument for a selective support 
scheme is that the public can direct support towards projects expected to have major positive external 
effects and consequently higher social than private economic return. A theoretical basis for such 
project selection is found in Jaffe (1998), who evaluates the potential for positive externalities 
(spillovers), private financial returns and additionality. 
4. Data  
The main data include information about the timing and amount of support from the three main R&D 
policy instruments: IN’s innovation program, direct R&D subsidies from the RCN, and SKF – the 
R&D tax credit scheme. Our data cover the period 2002-2013, and are merged with firm level register 
data collected by Statistics Norway. The data have the advantage that they are collected for public 
registering and have universal coverage for limited liability companies. Furthermore, they are 
scrutinised by Statistics Norway before being made public. Hence, the data are in general of a high 
quality.  
 
We limit the population of firms to limited liability companies (incorporated firms), since our 
performance indicators are based on accounting information. Incorporated firms contribute to 80-90 
percent of value added in the market-based industries (the excluded industries are: primary industries, 
health care and the government sector), and a roughly equal share of government R&D support. 
Furthermore, we exclude firms with their main activity in the industry Research and Development 
(NACE 72). The reason is that firms in this industry receive, directly or indirectly, R&D support on a 
regular basis. Thus, a proper control group cannot be established. 
 
                                                     
4 This share has been remarkably stable over time. See the web-article https://www.ssb.no/teknologi-
og-innovasjon/artikler-og-publikasjoner/stor-okning-i-bruk-av-skattefunn-ordningen (in Norwegian). 
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In all our analyses, we distinguish between (1) support to entrepreneurial firms, defined as firms that 
are less than three years of age (counted from the date of incorporation) at project start and (2) support 
to incumbent firms. 
Operationalisations 
One could argue that in an ideal environment one should observe both project identifiers and the 
outcome variables at the project level. However, in practice, all the outcome variables are available 
from register data collected at the level of the firm who obtains support. Hence, some form of 
aggregation from the project to firm level must be made. A further complication is that tax credits are 
available from tax accounts data and hence refer to a firm-year (a firm observed in a particular year), 
not to a specific research project. In the lack of unique project identifiers, we have to operationalize 
the concept of a research project. This concept must be applicable to all forms of monetary support, 
and co-funding of projects by multiple instruments. In particular, we must take into consideration that 
most projects have a duration beyond one year: the median duration of RCN-projects is three years, 
and the median number of years with consecutive tax refunds is two years. Moreover, the same project 
may get support from several sources.  
 
We proceed by making the following simplifying assumptions: (1) A project is triggered by an award. 
(2) The project is believed to start the year after the first occurring award (subsidy). (3) The project 
length is standardised to three years (the normal length of projects in the RCN). (4) If a firm gets 
additional subsidies during the project period of three years (regardless of source), this will be 
regarded as support for the same project. (5) The overall project support includes the sum of all 
support to the firm from all funding sources over the 3-year project period.  
 
To classify projects according to source of funding, we identify the main policy instrument, defined as 
the main source of funding during the three-year project period. Descriptive statistics to be detailed 
below, show that the main policy instrument accounts for the main part of funding at the project level. 
For projects with either RCN or IN as the main policy instrument, tax credits is the clear secondary 
source of support, whereas for projects with SKF as main policy instrument, support from additional 
sources is almost negligible. 
 
Given our operationalization of a research project, we estimate ATT at the project level for all three 
main policy instruments. Furthermore, we distinguish between whether the treatment was given to a 
start-up firm (defined as being at most 3 years old at project start-up) or an incumbent firm, and the 
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amount of support that was given: small; less than 0.5 mill. NOK, medium; between 0.5 and 1.5 mill. 
NOK, or large; above 1.5 mill. NOK. Thus, there are three dimensions in our reporting of ATT 
estimates: (1) main policy instrument of the project, (2) firm-age of the firm at project start-up, and (3) 
amount of support given to the project. These operationalisations mean that, conditional on the major 
source and total amount of funding, public support to a given project is assumed to have the same 
effect regardless of the presence of secondary sources of funding. Our approach can be seen as 
circumventing the endogeneity issues that would arise if we included control variables indicating 
secondary sources of funding. The corresponding coefficient estimates (of these control variables) 
could reflect the quality and nature of the project, rather than the causal effect of having multiple 
sources of funding.5 Our approach is also justified by Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bentoa (2013), who find 
that the estimated treatment effects of a regional R&D program in Belgium do not depend on dummy 
variables indicating the presence of a “subsidy mix”. 
 
The estimation of ATT is based on the standard approach in the treatment literature by forming a 
treatment group and control group by statistical matching. The control group includes firms that never 
get innovation related support from RCN, IN, or SKF. This group of firms consists of a selection of 
the reference population with observed characteristics similar to the companies that received funding. 
The matching method is a combination of stratified (exact) matching and propensity score matching 
(within each stratum). A more detailed description of the matching procedure is deferred to Section 5. 
Descriptive statistics 
Total R&D support from the three instruments to our firm-population during the period 2002-2014 
amounts to 28 billion NOK. Table 1 reports total support from each policy instrument, both before and 
after matching. We see from the first four columns in Table 1 that the total amount of R&D subsidies 
before match is 7.9 billion NOK for IN, 9.2 billion NOK from RCN, and 10.9 billion NOK from SKF, 
of which a little less than 80 percent is covered by the firms in the matched sample (see the last four 
columns in Table 1). The total support is divided into projects that may consist of funding from several 
sources throughout the project duration. As explained above, we classify each project according to the 
main policy instrument of the project supported. For example, while total support from IN is 7.2 
billion (before matching), total support to projects with IN as main policy instrument is 7.9 billion. 
There are two sources of the (positive) discrepancy of 0.7 billion: (1) some of the support from IN are 
                                                     
5 The situation is similar to attempting to estimate the returns to investments using the project size as a control variable. The 
finding that, say, large investments have higher average returns than small ones, does not imply that an increase in a given 
(small) investment would yield a higher return. 
11 
given to projects labelled “RCN-“ or “SKF” (in total 1 billion), and (2) some of the support to IN-
projects come from SKF (1.4 billion) or RCN (0.4 billion). The net effect is 0.7 billion.  
 
Table 1. Support in million NOK, by main policy instrument. Before and after match 
Support from  Main policy instrument 
  Before match After match  
 IN RCN SKF Total IN RCN SKF Total 
IN 6 245 367 627 7 240 6 245 239 481 6 967 
RCN 404 7 640 443 8 488 210 4 596 318 5 125 
SKF 1 293 1 191 9 869 12 354 952 760 7 949 9 663 
Total 7 943 9 198 10 940 28 081 7 408 5 597 8 750 21 755 
 
The number of projects by year and main policy instrument is shown in Table 2. We note that there 
has been a substantial decrease in the number of SKF-projects compared to the first years after the 
extension in 2003. Regarding IN, the number of projects was nearly doubled in 2010 compared to 
2008. This was the result of the government’s financial crisis stimulation package. The number of 
projects has remained at a much higher level also in the years after the crisis compared to the pre-crisis 
level, reflecting an increased importance of this instrument. In contrast, the number of RCN projects 
has been quite stable over time. 
 
Table 2. Number of projects by main policy instrument 
 Before match  After match 
  IN RCN SKF  IN RCN SKF 
2002 209 239 100  176 186 91 
2003 121 41 1 316  98 27 1144 
2004 102 54 1 446  75 39 1224 
2005 124 121 1 089  100 87 920 
2006 140 82 978  112 50 839 
2007 151 127 876  123 87 732 
2008 200 126 621  154 79 524 
2009 262 130 661  204 91 548 
2010 421 119 723  345 77 602 
2011 282 126 685  227 85 560 
2012 284 110 723  212 70 600 
2013 340 163 694  250 119 582 
2014 336 128 740  102 64 369 
Total 2972 1566 10652  2178 1061 8735 
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From the numbers in the three last columns of Table 2 – after match – and the corresponding numbers 
in Table 1, it follows that the average amount of funding per project with respectively IN, RCN, and 
SKF as the main policy instrument is: 3.4 million, 5.3 million, and 1.0 million.6  
 
Table 3. Share of project support from each policy instrument, by the projects’ main instrument. 
After match  
Support from Main policy instrument 
 IN RCN SKF 
IN 0.84 0.04 0.06 
RCN 0.03 0.82 0.04 
SKF 0.13 0.14 0.91 
Total            1.00              1.00              1.00  
 
In the rest of this section, we focus on the after-match sample. First, in Table 3, we report the share of 
support coming from the main instrument versus other sources. We see that projects with IN as the 
main instrument, obtain 84 percent of total project support from IN, projects with RCN as the main 
instrument obtain 82 percent from RCN and, finally, SKF-projects receive 91% of the support from 
this instrument. For both IN- and RCN-projects, SKF is the largest secondary source of funding, 
providing between 15 and 20 percent of total public support. The relatively high share of SKF-funding 
among the RCN-project is not surprising, as RCN-approved R&D projects are legally entitled to tax 
credits (with an upper limit at the firm level due to EEA rules). On the other hand, projects with SKF 
as the main instrument obtain a very small share of funding from RCN (4 percent). 
 
Table 4a. Number of projects by main policy instrument, support amount, and firm age 
category. After match 
Main policy 
instrument 
Start-up firms with support Incumbent firms with support 
Support amount (mill. NOK) Support amount (mill. NOK) 
Small (<0.5) Medium  Large (>1.5) Small (<0.5) Medium  Large (>1.5) 
IN 217 219 284 434 358 750 
RCN 41 26 117 178 155 592 
SKF 722 731 436 2 584 2 736 1 757 
Total 980 976 837 3196 3249 3099 
 
 
                                                     
6 The calculations are: 7408/2178=3.4, 5597/1061=5.3 and 8750/8735=1.0. 
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Table 4b. Share of support by main policy instrument, support amount, and firm age. After 
match 
Main policy 
instrument 
Start-up firms with support Incumbent firms with support 
Support amount Support amount 
Small (<0.5) Medium  Large (>1.5) Small (<0.5) Medium  Large (>1.5) 
IN 0.04 0.16 0.80 0.07 0.20 0.73 
RCN 0.02 0.06 0.92 0.02 0.10 0.87 
SKF 0.07 0.33 0.60 0.09 0.36 0.55 
 
More information about the support and the recipients is given in Tables 4a and 4b, which categorizes 
the project support along three dimensions: (1) main policy instrument, (2) support amount (small, 
medium or large) and (3) firm-age (start-up or incumbent). About one fourth of the projects are given 
to start-up firms. Approximately one third of the projects belong to each of the support amount 
categories, but with considerable heterogeneity across the main policy instruments. In particular, 
RCN-projects have a much higher share of large projects than IN and (in particular) SKF.  
 
Table 5. Share of project support by industry, after match 
NACE Share 
Manufacturing 0.66 
-Production of chemicals 0.17 
-Production of chemicals rubber and plastic products 0.06 
-Production of computers and el. and optical instr. 0.08 
-Production of motor vehicles 0.09 
Retail trade 0.04 
Information and communication 0.16 
Professional and scientific services 0.12 
Administrative services 0.03 
Total 1 
 
Table 5 provides information about the distribution of support across industries. We see that support is 
highly concentrated in a few industries, with 2/3 of total support going to Manufacturing (with 
Production of chemicals as the largest 2-digit NACE level industry). Then comes Information and 
communication (16 %) and Professional and scientific services (12 %). An almost negligible share of 
the support goes to other industries. 
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5. Matching methodology 
The classical matching estimator pairs the treated firms with a control group that is assumed to 
represent the counterfactual (non-treated) outcomes of the treated firms. The control group is selected 
based on a vector of matching variables, 
i
S , where subscript i denotes firm. Under certain conditions, 
a treated firm and the matching firms to which the treated firm is paired are identical in all respects, 
except a random term, 
i
 . The most important condition is that the untreated outcome (the 
counterfactual outcome of a treated unit) is independent of treatment assignment conditional on 
i
S . 
This is called the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), often referred to as 
unconfoundedness. In our context, this means that if a firm obtains (is assigned to) R&D support in 
period Ti, this assignment is per se uninformative about the counterfactual outcome of the dependent 
variable (given 
iiT
S ) in the post-treatment period, Ti +1. 
 
We will now first consider the estimation of a simplified version of our model, with a binary treatment 
indicator, {0,1}
i
D  , assigned at a fixed point in time, 
i
T  (which may differ across firms). 
Specifically, we will consider using a combination of differencing and matching, advocated by 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2009). 
 
Let (1)
it
y  and (0)ity  denote the dependent variable, the outcome of R&D support (treatment), when 
the (same) firm, i, obtains treatment and non-treatment, respectively. We assume that  
 
1
0
(1) ( ) 1( )
(0) ( )
it i t it i i it
it i t it it
y f m S t T
y f m S
       
   
 
 
where if  is a fixed firm effect, ( )t itm S  is a non-parametric (unknown) common trend function, i  is 
the firm-specific treatment effect and 1( )A  is the indicator function which is one if the statement A is 
true and zero otherwise. The vector itS  consists of a “minimal” set of observable variables that makes 
both error terms 
0
( | ) 0
it it
E S   and 
1
( | ) 0
it it
E S  . The realized (observed) value of ity is then 
( )
it i
y D . Thus, if 0iD  , neither (1)ity nor the assignment year, iT , are observed. 
 
The inclusion of the common trend function ( )t itm S in the model of ( )it iy D is important as the 
treatment group and the control group (the non-treated outcomes) must have the same trend. By 
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including ( )
t it
m S , we mitigate the potential problem that the observed (pre-treatment) characteristics, 
iiT
S , which determine the treatment assignment may also influence the outcome variable, 
, 1
( )
ii T i
y D .  
Based on the above model, we can formally define the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT): 
 
, 1 , 1
( (1) | 1) ( (0) | 1)
i ii Ti i iT
ATT E y D E y D      
 
Here 
, 1
( (1) | 1)
ii T i
E y D   is the expected (post-treatment) outcome for firms in the treated group, i.e. 
those who were assigned to R&D support at time 
i
T . This means that the post-treatment outcome,
, 1
(1)
ii T
y  , is observable for all firms in this group. On the other hand, , 1(0)ii Ty 
 is not observed if Di = 
1. Using the mean outcome of the firms that do not get R&D support: 
, 1
( (0) | 0)
ii T i
E y D   may not 
be appropriate for estimating 
, 1
( (0) | 1)
ii T i
E y D  . This non-interchangeability of 
, 1
( (0) | 0)
ii T i
E y D  and , 1( (0) | 1)ii T iE y D 
is due to the fact that characteristics that determine 
whether a firm gets R&D support are also likely to determine the future outcome of this firm. To deal 
with this potential effect, often referred to as the selection effect, we combine stratification and 
propensity score matching.7  
 
The specific motivation for stratification in our case is that cell characteristics are key determinants of 
both the probability of obtaining support, e.g. through regional programs and programs targeting 
young firms, and of the dependent variables, e.g. through industry-specific market conditions and local 
labour market conditions.8 More specifically, we do as follows: First, in any given year t, we stratify 
firms into industry–region–age cells ( , , )j r s  consisting of firms that belong to 2-digit NACE industry 
j, region r and age group s (1-3, 4-6, 7-9, or >9 years old). Next, within these industry-region-age 
specific cells, we construct a continuous matching variable, Sit, which in our application is a measure 
of the firms’ size (total assets).  
 
Now, within each stratum we use propensity score matching to match treated and non-treated firms 
using the matching variable, Sit. The probability of treatment given 
iiT
S : ( ) Pr( 1| )
i iiT i iT
P S D S   is 
                                                     
7 See the seminal contribution by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) who effectively reduced the multi-dimensional matching 
problem to a univariate one, by matching on the probability of treatment given 
iiT
S : ( ) Pr( 1| )
i iiT i iT
P S D S  . 
8 A general discussion of the pros and cons of matching with stratification are discussed in Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). 
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the so-called propensity score. Moreover, the log-odds ( ) / (1 ( ))
i iiT iT
P S P S is a non-linear function 
of Sit, specified as a piecewise linear spline. The kink points of the spline are located at the quartiles of 
the (cumulative) empirical distribution of the size variable (specific to each strata).  
 
The propensity score we estimate is a transition probability: the probability of transition at iT from 
previously having had no support, to obtaining first-time support from either IN, RCN, or SKF. The 
estimated propensity score of each firm in the group of treated firms is then matched with one or more 
of the nearest neighbours. See Appendix A for technical details. The matching procedure used is the 
STATA routine psmatch2 with 1 to 5 nearest neighbour matching with trimming.9  
 
The combination of stratification and propensity score matching yield a sample of comparable 
matched firms with an approximately balanced distribution of the observed characteristics, i.e. when 
we compare this distribution for the group of firms receiving R&D support and the group of matched 
firms not receiving such support. By further combining this matching procedure with a difference-in-
difference approach (DID), we are able to control for unobserved firm specific effects, 
i
f .10 The 
classical DID estimator when applied to a matched sample, can be expressed as: 
 
 
, 1 , 1
( )
1 1
# # ( )i iT
i T j TT
j C ii N
DID y y
N C i
 

 
    
 
 
  
 
where  
T
N  is the set of treated firms, ( )C i  is the control group of firms matched to firm Ti N   and 
#A denotes the number of elements in (any set) A. The estimation strategy is to contrast each post-
treatment outcome, 
, 1ii T
y  , in the treatment group, with the average outcome in the control group 
( )C i  (the firms matched to the treated firm i): 
 
                                                     
9 We use the command: psmatch2 common trim(10). This imposes a common support by dropping treatment observations 
whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the controls. It also drops 
10 percent of the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the control observations is lowest. See 
Leuven and Sianesi (2003) for documentation. 
10 It is an ongoing debate in the literature whether one would benefit from combining the two approaches; see for instance 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2009), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), Lechner (2010), and Chabé-Ferret (2015). We emphasise 
the argument used by Blundell and Costa Dias (2009, p. 604); “… the combination of matching with DID as proposed in 
Heckman et al. (1997) can accommodate unobserved determinants of the nontreated outcome affecting participation for as 
long as these are constant over time.” 
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, 1
( )
1
# ( ) i
j T
j C i
y
C i



. 
 
The DID estimator is given as the average over these contrasts (differences) over all the treated firms
T
i N . 
 
Above we have assumed that any effect of a treatment assigned in 
i
T  is realized immediately 
afterwards (in 1
i
T  ). However, in our application we have annual data (t is a calendar year), while 
treatment effects are naturally defined over longer time intervals, from project start (
i
T ) to project end 
or later (
i
T k , 3k  ). If 3k  (the project length), the average treatment effects of the treated is 
modified as follows:  
 
  
3
, ,
1
( | ) ( | ( )) |
i i
T T
i T k j T k
k
ATT E y i N E E y j C i i N 

      
 
 
(cf. the expression for DID above).  
 
To estimate ATT we apply a regression formulation of the DID estimator (see Lechner, 2010), rather 
than the classical DID estimator stated above. The regression formulation is:  
 
( ), 1
( ), 0
1( 3) / 3 , for ,
,  for ( ).
i
T
C i t iT i i it
C
i
j
t
t t tj i
m T t T i N
Cy i
y
m j
 



        
    
 
 
where the error term is assumed to have a moving average (MA(q)) distribution. The division by 3 in 
the expression above means that 
iiT
 can be interpreted as the 3-year change in ity induced by the 
treatment. The treatment effects at the firm-level (
iiT
 ) are allowed to be project-specific, implying
 |
i
T
iT
ATT E i N  . Note that the expressions for ity  include interaction terms between time 
dummies and cell membership, where the (cell-specific) common trend is:  
( ),
( ( )) | ( )).
C i t t jt
m E m S j C i  
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As pointed out by Lechner (2010), there are several advantages of the regression formulation of the 
DID identification and estimation problem – and, in fact, no disadvantages when control variables are 
not included (ibid p. 195), as in our case. The first advantage is the easiness of obtaining the final 
estimates and their standard errors. Second, the regression formulation naturally extends to an 
arbitrary choice of treatment interval. For example, we will examine “long-term” effects from project 
end to three years after project end, i.e. from 3
i
T   to 6
i
T  . Third, the regression formulation easily 
accommodates more treatments. This is important to us, as many firms do obtain repeated support. To 
accommodate repeated treatments, we replace 
i
T  with  – the year of the k’th treatment 
assignment – in the regression equation. Note that, by definition, a new project cannot overlap with the 
preceding project: (1) (2)1 3 3 ...
i i
T T     .   
6. Empirical results 
Assessing the matching quality 
The comparisons in Table 6 show that the median values of the outcome variables for the treatment 
and the control groups are similar at the time of matching (for the matched non-treated firms we do not 
separate between amount of support given to the corresponding treated firms). This ensures that the 
balancing properties of the matching hold. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the distributions of the estimated propensity scores in the treated and matched group 
of firms after the matching. The extreme values (minimum and maximum) of the propensity scores are 
trimmed to ensure that the common support condition is met. The results indicate that the distributions 
of the treated and the control groups are very similar.  
 
Estimates of relative ATT 
In our application, the dependent variable, yit ,denotes either: (1) log of sales revenue, (2) log of 
number of employees, (3) log of value added, (4) log-labour productivity (value added per employee), 
or (5) return on total assets. Thus, 
it
y  is approximately equal to the annual relative change in 
it
y .  
  
( )k
i
T
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Table 6. Median values of outcome variables at the year of matching, by amount of project 
support and main policy instrument 
  Treated group 
Control 
group 
    Before matching After matching 
Matched 
firms 
Main policy inst. – 
Outcome variable 
Age 
Category 
Support amount (mill. NOK) Support amount (mill. NOK)  
Small 
(<0.5) 
Medium 
(0.5-1.5) 
Large 
(>1.5) 
Small 
(<0.5) 
Medium 
(0.5-1.5) 
Large 
(>1.5) 
 
IN – No. of employees      
  Start-up 2 2 5 2 2 4 3 
    Incumbent 8 8 15 7 6 11 9 
IN – Value added per employee           
  Start-up 216 251 142 190 236 144 241 
   Incumbent 382 390 410 379 362 397 405 
IN – Return on total assets           
 
 Start-up 3 % 0 % -2 % 2 % -1 % -6 % 0 % 
    Incumbent 6 % 6 % 5 % 6 % 3 % 5 % 6 % 
RCN – No. of employees           
  Start-up 5 8 12 2 3 4 3 
   Incumbent 19 49 81 6 18 14 12 
RCN – Value added per employee           
  Start-up 300 362 381 261 439 263 306 
   Incumbent 422 444 515 451 503 520 461 
RCN – Return on total assets           
 
 Start-up -9 % 4 % 2 % -6 % 7 % -1 % 1 % 
    Incumbent 7 % 11 % 6 % 9 % 14 % 3 % 8 % 
SKF – No. of employees            
  Start-up 4 5 7 3 4 6 4 
   Incumbent 11 15 21 8 11 14 11 
SKF RCN – Value added per 
employee 
  
 
  
     
  Start-up 341 376 345 345 378 375 329 
   Incumbent 408 421 489 399 407 467 428 
SKF – Return on total assets            
 
 Start-up 8 % 7 % 4 % 11 % 7 % 4 % 5 % 
    Incumbent 11% 11 % 9 % 11 % 12 % 9 % 9 % 
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Figure 1: Distribution of propensity scores among treated and matched firms 
  
Tables 7-10 show the estimated treatment effects in percentage points over the three-year period from 
project start, 
i
T , to 3
i
T  , i.e. the average three-year growth difference between the treated and 
matched firms. When presenting the results below, we distinguish between different treatment groups 
according to the following characteristics of the supported project: (1) main policy instrument of the 
project (IN, SKF or RCN); (2) start-up firm (maximum three years old at project start) or incumbent 
firm; and (3) amount of project support (small, medium or large). This yields in total 3 2 2 12    
possible combinations. Each of these combinations constitute a specific treatment group, 
T
N . To 
simplify notation, ATT will denote the average treatment effect regardless of what treatment group is 
considered (this will be clear from the context). 
 
Table 7 presents average treatment effects (ATT) for each combination of main policy instrument and 
age group and does not distinguish between amounts of support. First, let us clarify the interpretation 
of the figures in the table by focusing on an example: growth in the number of employees for start-up 
firms receiving support from IN. According to Table 7, such firms will have 21.4 percentage points 
additional increase in headcount three years after project start compared with not receiving any 
support. This is a statistically significant estimate at the 0.1 percent level (as indicated by ***). For 
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incumbents, the corresponding estimated additional increase (ATT) is much smaller – 2.4 percentage 
points – which is not significant even at the 5 percent level. 
 
Table 7. Estimated ATT, by main policy instrument and firm age category. Three-year 
differences in percentage points1 
Outcome 
indicator 
Age 
category 
Main policy instrument 
IN  RCN  SKF 
Effect  z  Effect  z  Effect  z 
Sales Start-up 41.35 *** 5.44  39.98 * 2.56  33.32 *** 7.56 
 Incumbent 8.56 * 2.52  9.27 * 2.06  16.27 *** 10.58 
No. of 
employees Start-up 21.36 *** 5.25  24.80 ** 3.16  11.63 *** 4.92 
 Incumbent 2.47  1.26  -3.93  -1.55  5.55 *** 6.15 
Value added Start-up 14.29  1.89  41.60 ** 3.11  25.10 *** 6.39 
 Incumbent 5.51  1.76  10.65 ** 2.75  11.91 *** 9.09 
Labor 
productivity Start-up -5.03  -0.79  28.07 * 2.52  9.38 ** 2.91 
 Incumbent 1.93  0.86  3.92  1.44  3.92 *** 4.34 
Return on assets Start-up 1.41  0.98  1.07  0.42  0.85  1.05 
 Incumbent -0.68  -1.24  0.10  0.16  0.32  1.36 
1 Additional growth in percentage points during the three-year period from project start (year 
i
T ) to project end (
i
T +3). *, ** 
and *** denote significant estimates at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively 
 
There are three main takings from the numbers in Table 7. First, sales growth is the only indicator with 
significant estimates across all the policy instruments and age groups. Second, all policy instruments 
lead to significant increases in employment among start-up firms. Third, none of the instruments 
improves returns on assets. Looking at the results in Table 7 in more detail, we note the following: (1) 
The estimates for start-up firms across all the main policy instruments indicate significant estimates of 
30-40 percentage points increase in sales revenue (over three years), and 10-15 percentage points 
increase in employment. (2) The estimated ATT for incumbent firms is significant for all the 
instruments regarding sales revenue (8-16 percentage points estimated increase), but only support 
from SKF has a significant positive effect on employment (5 percentage points estimated increase). (3) 
Comparing start-up firms vs. incumbent firms, support from SKF leads to approximately 25 vs. 10-
percentage points increase in value added and 10 vs. 5-percentage points increase in labour 
productivity. (4) The corresponding results with regard to support from RCN are of a similar 
magnitude as for SKF, but less significant. (5) Support from IN does not seem to have any significant 
effects on incumbent firms, although the estimates for value added are close to being significant at the 
5 percent level. 
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The main policy instruments 
Tables 8-10 present results for each of the three main policy instruments along two dimensions: (1) 
amount of support (small – less than 0.5 mill. NOK, medium – between 0.5 and 1.5 mill. NOK, or 
large – above 1.5 mill. NOK) and (2) age-group. 
 
Table 8. Estimated ATT for Innovation Norway, by firm age category and amount of support.) 
Three-year differences in percentage points2 
Outcome indicator 
Age 
category 
Support amount (mill. NOK) 
Small (<0.5) Medium (0.5-1.5) Large (>1.5) 
Effect  z Effect  z Effect  z 
Sales Start-up 4.49  0.33 18.89  1.42 88.76 *** 7.33 
 Incumbent 0.20  0.03 -0.02  0.00 17.65 *** 3.58 
No. of employees Start-up 4.56  0.58 -0.39  -0.05 47.14 *** 7.71 
 Incumbent 4.27  1.12 -2.58  -0.65 3.88  1.39 
Value added Start-up 20.90  1.64 -4.59  -0.35 26.19 * 2 
 Incumbent 1.26  0.22 5.64  0.91 7.91  1.68 
Labor productivity Start-up 16.24  1.5 -25.68 * -2.3 -6.88  -0.63 
 Incumbent -0.51  -0.12 5.40  1.2 1.54  0.45 
Return on assets Start-up 5.80 * 2.19 -5.11  -1.96 3.14  1.4 
 Incumbent 0.10  0.09 -0.79  -0.71 -1.02  -1.29 
1 Projects with IN as main policy instrument.  
2 Additional growth in percentage points during the three-year period from project start (year 
i
T ) to project end (
i
T +3”). 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significant estimates at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively 
 
Results for IN-firms are reported in Table 8. We see that small or medium amounts of support have a 
marginal or even non-existing effect, while large amounts of aid given to start-up firms increase sales 
revenue, employment and value added with respectively 88, 47 and 26 percentage points according to 
our estimates. The results for incumbent firms are generally insignificant also for large amounts of 
support, except with respect to sales revenue (the estimated 18 percentage points of additional growth 
is significant at the 0.1 percent level). 
 
Table 9 reports the effects on the RCN-supported projects. Again, we find that small or medium 
amounts of support have only a marginal or non-existing effect. For large amounts given to start-up 
firms, the results show strong and significant effects for the outcome indicators sales revenue, number 
of employees, value added and labour productivity (more than 40 percentage points additional growth 
on all these indicators). On the other hand, for incumbent firms the estimates are generally 
insignificant also for large amounts of support. The only exception is with respect to value added, 
where the estimated ATT of 12 percentage points is significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 9. Estimated ATT for Research Council of Norway, by firm age category and amount of 
support.1 Three-year differences in percentage points2 
Outcome indicator 
Type 
of firm 
Support amount (mill. NOK) 
Small (<0.5) Medium (0.5-1.5) Large (>1.5) 
Effect  z Effect  z Effect  z 
Sales Start-up 39.64  1.13 24.02  0.66 44.83 * 2.31 
 Incumbent 4.60  0.45 22.78 * 2.17 6.57  1.14 
No. of employees Start-up -27.76  -1.47 14.40  0.77 41.05 *** 4.29 
 Incumbent -2.46  -0.42 -0.76  -0.13 -5.42  -1.68 
Value added Start-up 19.47  0.68 -6.20  -0.22 68.78 *** 3.88 
 Incumbent 4.71  0.52 10.82  1.23 11.93 * 2.38 
Labor productivity Start-up 32.12  1.32 -18.87  -0.82 45.90 ** 3.11 
 Incumbent 9.58  1.38 -0.59  -0.09 3.82  1.10 
Return on assets Start-up 7.71  1.33 1.88  0.31 -1.03  -0.32 
 Incumbent 2.59  1.61 0.72  0.46 -0.75  -0.89 
1 Projects with RCN as main policy instrument.  
2 Additional growth in percentage points during the three-year period from project start (year 
i
T ) to project end (
i
T +3”). 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significant estimates at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively 
 
 
Table 10 reports effects of the tax credit scheme SKF. Here we find statistically highly significant 
effects of large subsidies with respect to all outcome indicators, except return on total assets, where 
there is no effect in the case of incumbent firms. There also seem to be some statistically significant 
benefits of small (<0.5 million) and medium amounts of support (0.5-1.5 mill.) of this funding 
alternative, although there is a clear tendency that the effects increase with the amount of support 
given. Again, support given to start-up firms yields higher additional growth in percentage points than 
support given to incumbent firms. 
 
To examine the robustness of our results, Table 11 presents corresponding results as in Table 7 over 
the three-year period from project end to 3 years later (that is, from year 3
i
T   to year 6
i
T  ). These 
long-term effects are generally close to zero and insignificant, although there are some estimated 
effects that are significant at the 1 or 5 percent level. To summarize, there is no clear tendency for the 
effects to appear after the three-year project interval. Equally important is that we find no tendency of 
mean reversion: that gains achieved during the first 3-year interval are reversed during the next three 
years.  
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Table 10. Estimated ATT for SKF, by firm age category and amount of support.1 Three-year 
differences in percentage points2 
Effectindikator 
Type 
foretak 
Support amount (mill. NOK) 
Small (<0.5) Medium (0.5-1.5) Large (>1.5) 
Effect   z Effect   z Effect   z 
Sales Start-up 10.19  1.45 38.05 *** 5.54 63.48 *** 7.06 
 Incumbent 7.81 ** 3.14 15.48 *** 6.35 28.88 *** 9.94 
No. of employees Start-up 5.01  1.29 10.34 ** 2.84 23.81 *** 5.06 
 Incumbent 3.32 * 2.27 3.65 * 2.58 11.27 *** 6.68 
Value added Start-up 17.25 ** 2.84 21.33 *** 3.48 48.60 *** 5.66 
 Incumbent 8.20 *** 3.85 11.07 *** 5.27 18.14 *** 7.16 
Labor productivity Start-up 10.21 * 2.05 3.92  0.78 18.55 ** 2.65 
 Incumbent 4.52 ** 3.01 3.27 * 2.23 4.07 * 2.34 
Return on assets Start-up 0.44  0.34 -0.54  -0.42 4.06 * 2.4 
 Incumbent 0.67  1.73 -0.10  -0.25 0.44  0.99 
1 Projects with SKF as main policy instrument.  
2 Additional growth in percentage points during the three-year period from project start (year 
i
T ) to project end (
i
T +3”). 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significant estimates at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively 
 
Table 11. Estimated ATT measured from 3 to 6 years after project start, by main policy 
instrument and firm age category.1 Three-year differences in percentage points 
Outcome indicator 
Age 
category 
Main policy instrument 
IN  RCN  SKF 
Effect   z   Effect   z   Effect   z 
Sales Start-up 77  0.69  -0.08    -0.01  7.44  1.91 
 Incumbent -4.47  -0.89  -12.77  -1.74  -2.09   -1.00 
No. of employees Start-up 11.15 * 2.52  2.44  0.35  0.98  0.43 
 Incumbent -4.45  -1.52  -7.43  -1.79  -2.91 * -2.41 
Value added Start-up 5.08  0.65  -13.75  -1.11  7.08  1.85 
 Incumbent -15.09  ** -3.10  -6.56  -0.97  -3.49  -1.82 
Labor productivity Start-up 1.73  0.27  -7.27  -0.78  3.78  1.29 
 Incumbent -3.66  -0.96  -1.21  -0.23  0.48  0.33 
Return on assets Start-up 2.08  1.52  -4.68 * -2.32  0.84  1.24 
 Incumbent -0.91  -1.04  -2.33  -1.95  -0.65  -1.86 
1 Additional growth in percentage points during the period from project end ( 3
i
T  ) to three years later ( 6
i
T  ). Note: *, 
** and *** denote significant estimates at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively 
 
From percentage points to level effects 
To say something about the estimated effects when converted into level effects, we attempt to estimate 
the impact per million NOK in project support for a “representative firm” for each of the 12 treatment 
groups. How to define such a firm is, however, far from obvious. One possibility is as the median firm  
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Table 12. Characteristics of the representative firms in each treatment group1) 
    Before matching After matching 
Main policy inst. – 
Outcome indicator 
Age 
category 
Support amount (mill. NOK) Support amount (mill. NOK) 
Small 
(<0.5) 
Medium 
(0.5-1.5) 
Large (>1.5) 
Small 
(<0.5) 
Medium 
(0.5-1.5) 
Large 
(>1.5) 
IN – No. of employees          
  Start-up 5 7 24 3 3 11 
    Incumbent 29 37 51 18 14 24 
IN – Value added per employee        
  Start-up 319 359 375 334 308 92 
   Incumbent 427 445 477 417 508 238 
IN – Return on total assets         
 
 Start-up -1.26 -1.11 -0.28 -1.09 -8.04 -13.83 
    Incumbent 5.90 6.81 3.74 8.78 6.89 -5.43 
RCN – No. of employees        
  Start-up 40 94 228 14 7 7 
   Incumbent 112 206 605 20 57 44 
RCN – Value added per employee         
  Start-up 1197 380 1012 361 494 273 
   Incumbent 1696 736 1142 902 404 574 
RCN – Return on total assets         
 
 Start-up 14.74 1.57 12.02 3.78 2.53 -11.18 
    Incumbent 25.01 11.89 11.72 6.62 0.30 7.70 
SKF – No. of employees         
  Start-up 17 19 36 6 9 12 
   Incumbent 37 57 68 23 27 29 
SKF RCN – Value added per employee        
  Start-up 319 422 537 393 426 421 
   Incumbent 575 490 813 505 434 527 
SKF – Return on total assets         
 
 Start-up 1.32 2.63 6.06 5.32 0.74 -0.82 
    Incumbent 10.00 9.06 11.19 13.17 7.63 7.61 
1) Weighted average over firms within each treatment group at project start, with weights proportional 
to amount of support 
 
in each treatment group, as defined by the median values described in Table 6. The weakness of this 
approach is that equal weight is given to all the firms in a given treatment group (e.g. in the group of 
start-up firms, with small amount of support and SKF as main policy instrument), regardless of how 
much support each firm in that group received. Therefore, we have chosen to construct a 
representative firm within each treatment group as a weighted average firm (at project start-up) where 
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the weight is proportional to the amount of support given to the project. The characteristics of the 
representative firms are shown in Table 12. 
 
If we compare the “representative firms” reported in Table 12, with the “median firms” reported in 
Table 6, we see that the former is much larger as measured by number of employees (large firms get 
more support). This applies to all policy instruments, especially for firms within the treatment groups 
with large amounts of support. We further see that firms with large IN-funded projects score lower on 
the outcome indicators value added per employee and return on total assets than do firms with RCN- 
and SKF-projects.  
To estimate the level effect (or “return”) to a given support scheme, we initially estimate level effects 
per million in project support to the representative firm within each treatment group. This is done by 
combining the percentage points effect estimates from Tables 8-10 with the initial characteristics of 
the representative firm in each treatment group (see Table 12). Finally, given these level-estimates of 
treatment effects, we calculate the weighted-average level-effect for each main policy instrument as 
follows: the estimated level-effect in each category is weighted with its share of total amount of 
support, as reported in Table 4b. All these calculations were done separately for incumbent and start-
up firms. We can then interpret the result as an expression of the “return” on a representative project 
portfolio consisting of either incumbent or start-up firms for the given main policy instrument (6 
portfolios in total). Each of the portfolios (e.g. support to start-up firms by IN) then consists of a 
million NOK being allocated to small, medium and large projects in accordance with the six portfolio-
specific distributions in Table 4b. The final results are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Estimated effects in levels (numbers or NOK) per million NOK in project support. Three 
years after project start, by main policy instrument and firm age category 
Output- 
indicator Age category 
IN RCN SKF 
Effect Conf.intervall1) Effect Conf.intervall1) Effect Conf.intervall1) 
No. of employees           
 Start-up 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.0 -0.5 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.5 
 Incumbent 0.7 0.2 1.3 1.9 0.0 3.7 1.7 1.2 2.2 
Value added (in mill. NOK) 
        
 Start-up 0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.8 0.5 1. 0 
 Incumbent 0.3 0.0 0.5 1.7 0.1 3.3 1.8 1.3 2.2 
Value added per employee 
(in 1000 NOK)           
 Start-up -1.0 -13.0 11.0 27.0 -20.0 75.0 10.0 -14.0 33.0 
  Incumbent 18.0 4.0 32.0 -1.0 -38.0 35.0 16.0 3.0 29.0 
1 Lower and upper boundary in 95 % confidence interval 
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From Table 13 we see that the effect of a subsidy is significantly positive for all three main 
instruments when it comes to employment growth and value added for incumbents: Our point 
estimates suggest that the average effect of 1 million NOK in project support from IN to incumbent 
firms is 0.7 new employees and 0.3 million NOK in increased value added after three years. The 
corresponding estimates for RCN and SKF are significantly higher; respectively, 1.9 and 1.7 new 
employees and 1.8 million added growth. For start-up firms, the estimated effects per million in 
support are more modest. For IN and SKF, we estimate that the number of employees increases by, 
respectively, 0.8 and 1.1 per million NOK in support, while we find no significant effects of support 
from RCN. We note further that value added for start-up firms does not increase significantly either 
for IN or RCN support, while the increase is estimated to 0.8 million NOK per year and is 
significantly positive for SKF. Finally, we do not find significantly increased value added per 
employee (labour productivity) for any of the three instruments. 
 
What constitutes an adequate "return" of support is generally difficult to say when we are not talking 
about financial returns, but total value added (reward to labour and capital). In particular, it is difficult 
to estimate the opportunity cost of employed labour. One must also take into account administrative 
costs, which are significantly higher for RCN and IN than SKF. Note that the level estimates in Table 
13 are calculated on the assumption of a common treatment effect in percentage points per monetary 
unit in all the 12 treatment groups. Thus, the confidence intervals in Table 13 do not incorporate 
heterogeneity in treatment effects within each category. We see that the confidence intervals for the 
level estimates are sometimes very wide – this is especially true for the RCN. Thus, the statistical 
uncertainty is substantial. Nevertheless, these figures give a good indication of the magnitude we are 
talking about when the relative effect estimates are interpreted. 
 
Most of the existing literature has been concerned with input additionality and crowding out effects of 
public support to R&D (following Bloom et al., 2002), or with direct innovation outcomes such as 
patenting (see e.g. Cappelen et al., 2012). There is less empirical evidence with regard to economic 
outcomes in general, such as growth in value added, productivity and profitability. In particular, we 
are not aware of any comparative analysis of different support programs that attempt to quantify the 
causal effect of each of them. 
 
The existing literature indicate a positive correlation between R&D tax incentives and productivity 
(Cin et al., 2017). According to our findings, however, one should be careful about interpreting such 
correlations as evidence of causal effects. Lokshin and Mohnen (2013) and Moretti and Wilson (2014) 
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find positive effects of R&D support programs on employment growth, which is in line with our 
findings. Some exiting analyses have distinguished between the impact of public support to R&D on 
small and large firms. These studies generally find stronger effects on small firms than on large firms 
(e.g. Baghana and Mohnen, 2009; and Castellacci and Lie, 2015). This in line with our estimates of 
relative effects, since we get larger relative effect estimates for start-up firms than for incumbent firms 
(that is, effects measured in percentage points). However, these differences do not translate into larger 
level effects (e.g., in terms of number of employees or value added in NOK), which we estimate to be 
generally larger for incumbent firms than for start-up firms. 
7. Concluding remarks 
Research and development (R&D) investment is considered to be one of the main drivers of 
technological progress and economic growth. However, due to market failures, there is ample support 
among policy makers and academics for increased public R&D expenditures. In many countries, 
including Norway, where the data for this analysis come, there are several co-existent and potentially 
complementary support schemes. In this paper, we therefore analyse all the major sources of direct 
and indirect R&D subsidies simultaneously and compare their effects on individual firms’ 
performance. The three main schemes in Norway are analysed: innovation-oriented policies of 
Innovation Norway (IN), instruments of the Research Council of Norway (RCN), and the Norwegian 
R&D tax incentive scheme (SKF). Even though the targeted firms, their construction, and magnitude 
of support are somewhat different, all these schemes are meant to promote product or technology 
innovations. The empirical analyses are based on models from the treatment evaluation literature, 
matching a treated group of firms with an appropriate control group. Our analysis is made possible by 
our rich data set which enables us to link firm identifiers with records of received public support over 
a rather long period: 2003-2014. Furthermore, our data have universal coverage of incorporated firms 
and contain detailed accounting, employment and ownership information.  
 
The estimates of the average effects of support from IN (the innovation program) and SKF are positive 
and significant in terms of percentage points growth in number of employees, sales revenue and value 
added, but mostly non-significant with respect to labour productivity and return on total assets. For 
RCN we find generally less significant effects than for IN and SKF, but this can be explained by the 
fact that our matching procedure finds comparable firms for a small number of RCN firms. Results for 
RCN are therefore representative of a much smaller percentage of the RCN project portfolio (about 
1/5 of the total grant amount) than is the case for IN and SKF (about 2/3 of the amount of support). 
Regardless of policy instrument, there is a clear tendency that the estimated effects increase with the 
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amount of support. Support amounts under 500 000 NOK have little or no effect, whatever the 
instrument, while support amounts between 500.000 and 1.5 million NOK from RCN and IN have 
little or no effect. This applies whether the effects are measured three or six years after project start. 
 
For incumbent firms we find that the estimated level effects regarding the performance indicators 
employment and value added growth are significantly positive for all three main instruments. The 
estimates suggest that the average effect of 1 million NOK in project support from IN is approximately 
0.8 additional employees and 0.3 mill. NOK in increased value added after three years. The 
corresponding estimates for the RCN and SKF are significantly higher: respectively, 1.9 and 1.7 
additional employees and 1.8 million added growth. For start-up firms, we find effects that are more 
modest. For IN and SKF, we estimate that the number of employees increases, respectively by 0.8 and 
1.2 per million in funding. We find no significant effects on the number of employees of support from 
RCN. Neither support from IN nor from RCN contributes to significant effects with respect to value 
added, but the effect is significant for a typical start-up firm receiving SKF subsidies and is estimated 
to be 800 000 NOK in increased value added during 3 years per million NOK in funding. 
The rather modest or even insignificant returns to small amounts of R&D support might indicate that 
all the three schemes should be reallocated and concentrated instead of distributing small amounts to a 
large number of firms. Note however, that our analysis is not a cost-benefit analysis where also 
administrative costs are taken into account. Such a more extensive and broader analysis should be 
addressed in future work. When we find that start-up firms seem not to benefit from the existing 
support schemes, it might call for alternative schemes, better screening, or forming of new schemes 
that are better able to target the profitable and social beneficiary projects. Since government funding 
and therefore the sustainability of the welfare states both in Norway and most industrialized countries 
are under severe pressure in the years to come, further economic growth is likely to depend 
increasingly on R&D investments and innovation activities in the industries. Thus, increased 
knowledge about the efficiency and accuracy of the various R&D schemes are essential.   
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Appendix A: The matching 
For any treated firm: (1)
i i
T T  (the year of first-time support). Furthermore, let 
( ) ( (1),..., ( ))M n m m n , where 1n   is the number of treatments and ( )m k  is a vector of 
characteristics of the k’th treatment (we will return to this below). The realized treatments of firm i as 
of year t is denoted ( ) ( (1),..., ( ))
i it i i it
M N m m N  ( (0)
i
M  denotes no treatment). Note that 
treatments are multidimensional; not only may there be several treatments ( 1itN  ), but the 
characteristics of the treatments may differ (source and amount of funding. etc.). 
 
Define the treatment group ( )T
jrs
N t  as the group of firms that obtained first-time support of a project in 
year t  and belong to the cell ( , , )j r s and let ( , )C i t denote the cell of firm i at t.. The corresponding 
control group is denoted ( )
C
jrs
N t  and is obtained by matching firms in ( )
T
jrs
N t  to non-treated firms in 
the same cell in year t . Then define T
jrst
N  and C
jrst
N  as the union over t of, respectively ( )T
jrs
N t  and 
( )
C
jrs
N t  
 
Note that a firm can belong to C
jrs
N  only if it obtained no support during the whole observation period. 
Furthermore, define 
 
(1)
( ( )) Pr( ( ) ( ) | ( , ) ( , , ), )
jrst i iT i
M n M N M n C i t j r s T t      
 
It follows from Lechner (2001) that ( )
jrst it
P S  will be a balancing score for ( )i iTM N  if the following 
condition holds: 
 
(1)
Pr( ( ) ( ) | S , ( , ) ( , , ), ) ( ( ))
i iT it i jrst
M N M n C i t j r s T t M n     
 
That is, how many treatments a firm gets – or their characteristics – given that it obtains the first 
treatment at t, do not depend on the matching variables, 
it
S . It follows that 
 
(1)
Pr( ( ) ( ) | S , ( , ) ( , , ), ) ( ( )) P ( )
i iT it i jrst jrst it
M N M n C i t j r s T t M n S    . 
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Since the factor ( ( ))
jrst
M n  is common to all firms in T Cjrst jrstN N , ( )jrst itP S will be a balancing score 
for ( )
i iT
M N  if it is a balancing score for (1)
i
T . As shown by Lechner (2001), given the common 
support assumption 0 ( ) 1
jrst it
P S  . 
 
 (0), (1) ( ) | P ( )
i iit it i iT jrsT iT
M N S   . 
 
Note that this is a non-trivial extension of the classical matching result, as 
it
N  is a counting variable, 
not a binary treatment indicator.  
 
We will consider the following treatment characteristics: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( , , )
k k k
m k T A S  
 
where ( )kA is the amount of funding, and ( )kS the main source of funding associated with the k’th 
treatment. Because of the multidimensional character of the treatment trajectory, different types of 
average treatment effects among the treated (ATT) may be estimated. We will present ATT by main 
policy instrument (S), amount of support (A), and age group (s), denoted ( , , )S A s : 
 
 ( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , , )Pr , ,S A s n n n S A s niT i i i
n
N n S S A A Age s       
 
Where 
 
( )( , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( , , , )i
m nS A s n n n n
i iT i i i
E N n S S A A Age s       
 
and by source (S) and amount (A), denoted 
( , )A S : 
 
 ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , , )
,
Pr , ,
S s n n n n S A s
iT i i i
n a
N n A a S S Age s       
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